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Abstract— Software systems are unlike most entities whose
existence, persistence, development, and integrity as single in-
dividuals are presupposed by ordinary acts of naming. This
paper broaches the issue of how naming practices in software
evolution may signiﬁcantly impact software maintenance and
evolvability. We explore how naming in the realm of software
is unlike naming of other types of phenomena to which we apply
usual human naming practices. Such naming practices have been
naively generalized to the realm of software. In the software
realm, naming practices have been co-opted for political roles
in reiﬁcation as well as in the mobilization of commitment and
resources.
I. INTRODUCTION - WHAT’S IN A NAME?
One important issue regarding the maintenance of a system
is the fairly obvious point that before we can “maintain”
we must have “a system” upon which our maintenance can
be deployed. But what exactly does this mean? This is a
question that, we believe, has not been given the attention
it deserves in the Software Engineering community, perhaps
as a consequence of the often cited movement towards a
Postmodern perspective where “theory” and “‘philosophy” are
seen as distractions from the really important activities of
“getting things done”.
In this paper we suggest that there is an important area
of debate that is rarely (if ever?) discussed: what creates a
“system” as an entity that has some existence in its own
right and hence entitles it to a programme of maintenance? In
particular, we will focus on one area where (as far as we are
aware) there has been no discussion, the naming of systems.
This is an extremely complex issue, and our intention here
is not to present a coherent treatise on the subject, but to
offer up a series of questions in the hope that philosophers,
psychologists, linguists, and other experts in these sorts of
ﬁelds might help us to clarify the issues. An essential general
reference to the whole area of naming is Salmon [19].
Our preliminary discussions on the topic have revealed one
thing: the question explodes in multiple dimensions before
we can even think of entering an analytical phase of seeking
clariﬁcation and “answers”. Perhaps this paper will help the
process along by promoting some interest. We should, how-
ever, explain brieﬂy why these issues are of relevance to the
Software Maintenance community.
II. WHAT IS SOFTWARE MAINTENANCE?
Consider the task of maintaining a motor car engine: we
have a set of conditions that specify the correct set up and
behaviour of the engine, and maintenance consists largely of
taking the existing engine and making minor changes so that
these conditions are met. Adding oil until the correct mark is
reached, adjusting the timing until it is within given tolerances,
and so on. We may need to replace a component, such as a
ﬁlter, as a way of returning the engine to the correct state. We
would be very surprised, however, if the mechanic informed
us that, as part of the maintenance programme, the motor
vehicle could now travel underwater, cook our evening meal,
and receive 32 digital television stations. We might even be a
little annoyed if informed that, in “addition”, the vehicle could
no longer be driven on roads.
In the software design culture, however, that is precisely
what we have come to expect (and accept). As Turski notes:
“The crux of the matter is that an ineptly chosen term
masks the real issue. (Once again, sloppy linguistic
habits and a childish enthusiasm for new games that
can be played without rules have lead us astray.)
Maintenance, as deﬁned by dictionaries, is the act
of maintaining, i.e. of keeping in an existing state,
of sustaining against opposition or danger, etc. Yet,
to quote a friend of mine, software engineering is
the only discipline where adding a new wing to
a building would be considered as a maintenance
activity.” [22, p. 107]
We would argue that one aspect of this problem is the
way we create the impression that an artifact is of a status
to be maintained in the ﬁrst place. One important aspect
of this is the decision to “name”, for this provides identity
and also something that we can relate to in political and
emotional terms. In naming a system, not only do we risk
the reiﬁcation of something without necessarily considering
all of our actions, but we also may be creating some notion
of stability or persistence that was not intended.
A. Naming and Evolution of “the Word Processor”
Early “word processor” systems were designed largely as
software emulators of typewriters, the latter having changed
relatively little in the previous 50 years. It might be reasonable,
therefore, to expect a maintenance phase as we improved
our word processors so that they became better emulations.
Of course, what happened is that the technical potential of
such interactive software systems was quickly realized, and
developments took place that moved them far from the realms
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of typewriters [11]. This is progress, and not at all prob-
lematic. However, something rather more subtle accompanied
this movement: various word processors were named1 en
route. Thus we had “Word” “Word Perfect” “WordStar” ,
“MacWrite”, and many others. At the time, this seemed quite
harmless and natural, but what are the consequences?
B. Speech Acts
Note that the naming process was carried out (to use
Austin’s term) by speech acts [1], most often by the employ-
ment of names with the tacit presupposition of the existence
of “the system” – treating the system’s very existence and its
conceptual coherence as an entity as a fait accompli. Naturally,
such naming was carried out in a very uncontrolled fashion.
A speech act can be informally deﬁned as something said or
written by somebody that in itself constitutes the act. Examples
include naming a ship, promising to do something, or saying
“I do” in a marriage ceremony. In order for the speech act
to be effective, it must conform to certain conditions, initially
described by Austin [1, pp. 14–15] and later formalized and
substantially extended by Searle ([20], [21, p. 158–9]). These
conditions are referred to as felicity conditions, and failures in
such conditions as infelicities. Infelicities can arise in a speech
act due to the correct procedure/ceremony for the speech act
not being followed or being followed by somebody without
the authority to perform it, e.g. the authors of this paper are
unfortunately unable to pass legislation to govern the United
Kingdom since they are not members of its parliament. Other
infelicities can arise due to the procedure as laid down not
being carried out correctly or completely. Another class of
infelicity occurs when a speech act is performed insincerely,
in the course of a play or other mimicking of reality, e.g.
a marriage conducted by actors as part of a theatrical perfor-
mance is not valid; whereas uttering an insincere promise does
constitute an (abused) act of promising. [1, p. 16].
Reference via a name is explicitly treated by Searle as a
speech act [20, Ch. 4]. The concepts of a speech act, and
the deﬁnitions of felicity conditions and infelicities, bring into
focus the question of how and when a software system can
be, and is, validly named. Who can name a system? How is
this naming performed?
Is there some form which is a procedure of naming, and if
so how is the completeness and correctness of its performance
evidenced? Can a system be named insincerely, say if a system
which is not intended to actually be developed is announced
to the public to spoil a competitor’s marketing plans?2 What
are the implications of the naming of a system of its being
cancelled after having been announced with sincere intentions?
C. Naming Acts in Practice
For software systems, such as in the naming of the word pro-
cessing systems mentioned above, there were no discussions
1We will leave aside for the moment the equally problematic issue of
adopting the generic name “word processor” - cf. sec. III.B.
2A related area is the advent of web domain names and their subsequent
creation and marketing as a commodity, as well as the use of web domain
names that are misleadingly similar to well-known ones.
to clarify under what felicity conditions such acts were safe.
It was unclear who had the authority to invoke the names (we
will not be drawn here into the issues surrounding the legal
positions of such names). There were no apparent rituals, such
as Baptism, to name the systems. And, perhaps more worrying,
no apparent understanding of the implications for the various
stakeholders that naming entails. Once we had been given, e.g.,
“Word”, however, clearly there was something in existence
that was a potential candidate for maintenance, even if it was
unclear what this might mean for the system in question.
Applying names, version, and release numbers to collections
of software code can help clarify reference, but they do not
completely solve problems that arise when names are used
as if they referred to natural kinds or unambiguous species
terms. Viewing the naming of systems as a social process (as
suggested for other aspects of software [3], [4]), the degree to
which naming can or should be formalized or regulated is a
completely open question. At this stage we can only glimpse
some of its the consequences of naming practices.
III. PRESUPPOSITION OF INDIVIDUAL INTEGRITY
A. Life-Cycle Model
We should note in passing that many of the problems
of system identity are inherently built in to the life-cycle
model of system “development”. For example, there is the
usual ambiguity in the way that we view such cycles in
biological sciences: is it the life of an individual that is being
focused upon, or that of the development of a species? If it
is one individual, say Freddy the Frog, we traditionally have
some understanding of what Freddy “is” – the “encoding” of
Freddy is within his inherited genetic material and he will
develop in accordance with the laws of nature given a suitable
environment (cf. [15]). Freddy will have some existence in
the real world (embryonic Freddy is only of interest because
we have faith that the “real” Freddy will soon be happily
hopping around with a genuine external presence). Of course,
modern biotechnology has caused us to question some of
these assumptions. We would argue that using this analogy
in Software Development presents even more problems, but
that these are rarely recognized, let alone made explicit.
Of course, it might be argued that the life cycle metaphor
in Software Engineering is intended to suggest not “Freddy
the Frog” developing, but the ways in which the species
“Frog” propagates and evolves. This would certainly seem
more plausible, but is no less problematic. In the case of
our frogs, we have some external reference as to what the
species is — the life cycle thus refers to something we are
able to appreciate as having an independent existence. Indeed,
it was the miraculous existence of “Frogs” in general and
Freddy in particular that made us seek an understanding of
how life propagates and evolutionary changes occur. That was,
of course, the origins of the Software Life Cycle too, but now
the term seems to have become more instrumental, deﬁning
the process we should follow.
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B. Species and Natural Kinds of Software?
Species in natural language (as opposed to biology) are
deﬁned by paradigmatic examples. Clearly by this description
Windows could not be the name of a species in this sense, for
we cannot apply the name Windows without legal permission,
and its development route is important to the name (Microsoft
only). If we explore this further it gets quite complex. So,
what do we understand by named systems such as “Windows”?
What sort of name is it? Is it a proper name that denotes some
thing perhaps the master set of discs held in a safe at Microsoft
Head Ofﬁce? Or perhaps “Windows” is a like a natural kind
term, such as “water”, denoting something by virtue of the
properties it possesses? Natural kind terms were introduced to
discuss names for things in classes that, as the name suggests,
occur naturally – that is, that have some independent existence.
It is far from clear that we can possibly consider their use
in the very artiﬁcial world of software systems, but there
may be some mileage in a brief diversion into one aspect of
this. Putnam [18] makes the point that terms such as “water”
have been used for centuries, pre-dating much of our current
understanding of the term. Indeed, the term might well have
been applied to many colourless, odourless, liquids that were
not H2O at all. The crucial issue is that there should be some
sameness relation that is used at the time to test substances
against those which we all accept as water.
“The key point is that the relation same is a theoretical
relation: whether or not something is the same liquid as this
may take an indeterminate amount of scientiﬁc investigation
to determine. Thus the fact that an English speaker in 1750
might have called [something with chemical composition]
XYZ “water”, whereas he or his successors would not have
called XYZ “water” in 1800 or 1850 does not mean that the
“meaning” of “water” changed for the average speaker in the
interval.” [18, Putnam, pp. 702–703].
We would argue that there is no agreed upon theoretical
understanding of what constitutes sameness for “species” in
software, such as Windows, which does not comprise a natural
kind. Accepting these software names as natural kind-like
terms may be a dangerous practice leading to the misuse and
abuse of reference in arguments concerning the properties of
such “systems”.
From this perspective we might want to consider whether
our systems have some existence independent of the theoretical
presentations that we give them at particular instances of time.
This is a counter-intuitive view for most practitioners, as it
suggests that design is driven by theoretical considerations.
For a more detailed discussion of this viewpoint, see [10].
If we do want to pursue this approach, however, we need to
consider the implications of accepting as natural terms things
which are not rigid designators. The assumption made by
Putnam and others is that terms such as “water” denotes some
well-deﬁned entity. But in case of a named product, subsequent
speech acts may be carried out referring to identically denoted
products that slip in unexpected modiﬁcations of “the” system.
IV. EVOLUTION, NAMING AND PERSISTENCE ENTITIES
Naming of objects, natural phenomena, whether individuals
or classes of them, works in a particular way that generally
pre-supposes the existence and the continued persistence of
the entities named. When we name persons these assumptions
are naturally satisﬁed, and we are able to apply a name
without much ambiguity to a person even though the individual
changes and develops through radically different forms in
the course of life. Most biological organisms have a natural
persistence and integrity that allows us to do this. Our usual
ways of using naming have been co-opted (or “exapted”) to a
new realm when we apply naming to software systems.
A. Naming Species
Biological species and software ‘species’ are radically
different. For software, we lack both an adequate concept
of species and an adequate notion of what constitutes an
individual. Named individuals in our usual experience do not
bifurcate and become different instances of a single entity with
different characteristics and developmental routes. If Freddy
the Frog were to do so, would we continue to apply a single
name to it/them?
Such bifurcation however is frequent in the software realm,
suggesting a vague parallel with the species concept in biology.
People use names for ‘species’ of software that exist in
multiple instances, versions, and releases. What governs the
naming of species (e.g. is Windows a species, or Word, or web
browsers, ..? ). Are WIMP/windowing systems a species? If
so, what holds them together, esp. if the analysis, design, code
are very different?
In biology there are several more or less clearly deﬁned
and well-debated criteria for testing whether a given popula-
tion comprises a species (cf. [12] for a discussion), but to
our knowledge no such coherent species concept has been
developed for software systems.
B. Evolution in Software and in Biology
Evolvability in biology (and some of its generalizations)
is the capacity for generating adaptive heritable genotypic and
phenotypic variation [15]. It is a striking property of biological
systems that has not yet been successfully understood in
detail, nor in its formal and system-theoretic aspects, nor has
it been successfully modelled computationally or applied in
software systems or evolutionary computation. How to achieve
robustness, adaptability, and ﬂexibility in facing changing re-
quirements and environments is a paramount issue for software
and related systems, not yet adequately addressed by previous
work either in computer science or biological systems.
C. Individuals
Darwin’s broad sense of evolution in organismal species as
“descent with modiﬁcation” applies at the level of populations
of the individuals in a species over time undergoing a dy-
namical process with heritability, variability, selection (“strug-
gle for existence”) and limited resources. Populations rather
than individuals evolve (although individuals may change and
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develop in their life times), but well-deﬁned individuals are
required for the Darwinian theory to apply [13], [2], [14].
Persistence of changing entities is a weaker analogue of well-
deﬁned individuality in an evolutionary dynamic, and occurs
also in other candidate spheres of evolutionary phenomena
such as memes, software, or physical technological artifacts
[16].
The software engineering community uses the term ‘evo-
lution’ in a broader sense that also focuses on the descent
with modiﬁcation of software systems, but does not actually
presuppose populations of competing individuals of the same
species. Where software systems are seen as being modiﬁed
and maintained in the face of changing requirements and
contexts of use [4], [6], selection (success in the struggle for
existence) is not usually discussed; and, increasingly, system
boundaries are becoming difﬁcult or impossible to delineate.
Nevertheless, explicit empirical laws for the evolution of
particular classes of software systems can be formulated [9].
Discussions of evolution of software, therefore, and of
evolution in some of the other realms mentioned above
(physical artifacts, memes), require a somewhat more general
theory than that of Darwinian evolution with its individuals.
Most importantly, software evolution differs from biological
evolution in a crucial way related to naming: There is currently
no well-circumscribed notion of what constitutes an individual
software system.
D. Theory Building and the Evolvability of Software
Given the considerations on naming discussed here, it is
abundantly clear that the existence and persistence of single
entity over a longer temporal extent is not to be taken for
granted when we move from the world of organisms or
everyday objects into the world of software. It might even
be the case that the notion of a developing individual – “the
system” and “its life cycle” is not an appropriate metaphor
in the realm of software maintenance and evolvability. An
alternative metaphor is to developed problem solving and
theory building as the central focus of software engineering,
where software systems become not individuals, but instead,
manifestations (in fact epiphenomena) of the more central
activities of problem solving and theory building aimed at
understanding and manipulating a given problem domain (cf.
[10], [11]).
V. EXAMPLE: NAMING AND REFERRING TO BLOBBO
Let us suppose that we are dealing with the names of
particular entities. Consider a ﬁctitious software enterprise.
A company wishes to develop a system to handle its clean-
ing schedules for premises, including purchasing supplies,
allocating staff, health and safety issues, and various other
features that it has not yet speciﬁcally identiﬁed. We would
argue that, left in this vague state, development could proceed,
but at some point the individual stakeholders are likely to
decide upon a name for the enterprise. Let us suppose that
they decide to call it “Blobbo”. One important issue arises
immediately: Does “Blobbo” designate the system or the
project? We would argue that whatever the intention at the
outset, the move to “Blobbo” denoting the system (in some
sense) is likely to occur. Thus “project Blobbo” becomes
“system Blobbo”. References to “Blobbo” constitute speech
acts that reify Blobbo as a system. Why is this important?
As a project, Blobbo is clearly something being carried out
by people. As an artifact, however, there is a very real risk
or hope that Blobbo will be brought into existence. It will be
reiﬁed. We will talk of Blobbo as if it has some rights and life
of its own. It will “develop” rather than be designed. What are
the implications of the speech acts of naming and referring to
Blobbo? Will stakeholders now act as if the system has been
brought into existence? We now proceed as if Blobbo refers
to the system. Exactly what is Blobbo? Note that, during the
early stages of the project there is ‘no’ Blobbo. We cannot
point at it, or touch it. No instrument can detect it. It is the
idea of a Blobbo rather than the reality. The decision to name
it (like the unborn child or yet to be conceived child) makes
it more real, so that we can interact with it in subtle ways.
Note that strictly, as it has no existence, it cannot “change”,
but people’s perceptions and ideas of it can change.
Our projections of what the system might be are constantly
changing as it is discussed. Here we are ﬁrmly in the world of
modalities, where we need to consider the potential existence
of Blobbo in a number of possible worlds. One way to consider
this is to think of Blobbo as a system with state. Kripke likens
this to the situation with a pair of dice: we are happy to think
of the values shown on the faces of a pair of dice even if we
don’t know exactly what they are [5, pp. 16-21]. There has
been extensive debate in philosophy about such issues, but
this usually rotate around questions such as “Would the term
‘Nixon’ still designate the same person if he had not been
President of the United States?”.
For our purposes we are discussing the potential referents of
a name for which no real entity yet exists. Once again there
have been discussions on the naming of non-existent things
like unicorns, but there is no intention that, helped by the
process of naming, the unicorn will be brought into existence.
Let us move on to the situation where Blobbo has been given
some substance (either as a speciﬁcation or as some executable
code). At this stage we need to consider what happens if
Blobbo changes. There seems little concern that changing a
few lines of code in Blobbo still leaves us with Blobbo. But
suppose we were to decide that Blobbo should now be the
name of the system that carries out all personnel functions
of the enterprise, or stock control, or investment functions, ...
How much change can we accept and still use the name? To
quote Kripke,
There is some vagueness here. If a chip, or molecule,
of a given table had been replaced by another we
would be content to say that we have the same table.
But if too many chips were different, we would
seem to have a different one. The same problem can,
of course, arise for identity over time. Where the
identity relation is vague, it may seem intransitive;
a chain of apparent identities may yield an apparent
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non-identity... It seems , however, utopian to suppose
that we will ever reach a level of ultimate basic
particulars for which identity relations are never
vague and the danger of intransitivity is eliminated.
The danger usually does not arise in practice, so
we ordinarily can speak simply of identity without
worry. Logicians have not developed a logic of
vagueness. [5, p. 51]
We would argue that, on the contrary, if Turski is to be
believed, in Software Engineering this danger arises all the
time. The ease with which components of software systems
can be changed leads to precisely the lack of transitivity and
vagueness that should cause us concern. Do we have any
understanding of what a simple sounding sentence such as
“you cannot do that in Windows” actually means? Or “Blobbo
will be fully tested by next quarter.”
VI. COMMITMENT AND MOBILIZATION OF RESOURCES
VIA NAMING
The act of naming seems to attribute solid foundations to a
system. It “is”. It has some status in the world. The mere act
of talking about it gives political stature and people refer to
“it” in the real world as if it existed, even when it does not
exist. Naming the system helps serve to organize and direct
the ﬂow of resources, including the activity of people, toward
its realization (cf. [8]).
What happens when the “it”, the expected system fails
to become reality? Writing of the Aramis subway transport
system for Paris that after many years of effort did not become
a real entity and fulﬁll the tacit promise of its having been
named, philosopher of science and technology Bruno Latour
investigates what led to the project’s demise; characterizing
the situation, he concludes:
“Either Aramis really existed and it had been killed (the
elected ofﬁcials, the Budget Ofﬁcer, the politicians had killed
it; there really had been murder, blindness, obscurantism),
or else, at the other extreme, Aramis had never existed: it
had remained inconceivable since 1981, and a different crime
had been committed by a different sort of blindness, another
obscurantism; for years on end they’d been drawing funds for
nothing – a pure loss.” [7, p. 279]
Latour goes on the make the point that the project had
reached a state where differing groups behaved as if Aramis
were both killed and had never existed - a paradox, which he
explains by observing that “Aramis” had come to mean two
different things to those inside the project (such as designers
and developers) and those outside (such as politicians) and
that the two groups “did not discuss it. They [the politicians
and other outsiders] don’t know what research is. They think
it amounts to throwing money out the window! Whilst every-
thing is shifting around inside the Aramis mobile unit, outside
everything is carved in stone” [7, p. 282].
Thus Aramis, at the outset, denotes a shared idea, but for one
group the role of the name is to ﬁx the concept over time, for
the other it denotes the current state of a shared understanding.
The recipe for disaster is ﬁrmly established - designers will
report that Aramis is “developing” nicely (meaning the shared
understanding is continuing to evolve), and the politicians will
hear that the development is closer to their original ideas of
what Aramis should be.
VII. SOCIAL USE OF NAMES
At this stage perhaps we should consider the social use of
names. There is a point of view that considers names to be
simply things that refer to something in the real world. This is
simplistic and clearly inappropriate for our needs, for – again
to quote Kripke – “that’s not what most of us do. Someone,
let’s say, a baby, is born; his parents call him by a certain
name. They talk about him to their friends. Other people meet
him. Through various sorts of talk the name is spread from
link to link as if by a chain.” [5, p. 91]
Thus the name and what it refers to develop through
social interaction. Where the name refers to some object in
the physical world, this need not be problematic, but what
happens in the case of Blobbo? How do we ensure that, in
the early stages, Blobbo will be a consistent being, capable of
realization? How many systems, having been named, are then
pushed by social discourse into a position where they simply
cannot be realized?
VIII. CONCLUSIONS - EPILOGUE (OR PROLOGUE)
Practices of naming and reference shape how software
evolution and maintenance occur. We need to decide as a
community whether the issue of how we name software
systems is important. And, if it is, how can we understand the
mechanisms of naming practices and their impact on software
systems? Might it be possible to ‘reform’ naming practices
to achieve better software evolvability? Are there situations in
the course of software evolution where we are breaking (or
should be breaking) the laws and continuity of naming?
To summarize, we record some aspects of the naming of
systems discussed above that are worthy of attention:
1) Reiﬁcation, Persistence, Continuity. Naming and re-
ferring to a system tacitly asserts its individual integrity
and presupposes a continual inertia of persistence over
time.
2) Commitment of resources. As a named, reiﬁed project,
a system appears to those hearing about it as having an
individual integrity. Since it has a name, this suggests to
others someone or some group has allocated resources
for its development and is committed to nurturing it to
realization and to maintaining it.
3) Naming and no entity. A system may be named yet
nothing tangible exist, e.g. an example is an announced
system. If sufﬁcient people refer to Blobbo (even if
the term designates nothing as yet), then Blobbo will
develop (it is presumed).
4) Naming and coming into being. Via naming a project
or project idea, a transition is made to ‘systemhood’. The
activity of the project is conﬂated with or converted into
the system as an entity.
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5) Same name for multiple identities. Referring to a
system by name often comprises reference a collec-
tion of entities whose properties are not (and in some
cases, cannot be) clearly circumscribed although they
are treated like ‘natural kinds’ or ‘species’. There are
at least the following several ways in which this may
occur:
a) Multiple copies. This is the most trivial kind:
multiple copies exist with only minor differences
of parameter settings, location, etc.
b) Diachronic multiplicity: multiple versions exist
arising over time - descent with modiﬁcation, via
software maintenance and evolution.
c) Synchronous multiplicity: Multiple versions exist
that are all called by the same name but that
may not have the same functionality, code, or
manufacturer, etc.
6) Incommensurability. Incommensurability of naming
is illustrated by the example of a transactional ma-
chine environment, intended to support both distributed
databases and real-time queries. The interaction of these
two requirements and the initial difﬁculty of reconciling
them with technical issues leads the marketing depart-
ment at ﬁrst to sell two or more versions to different
target groups of buyers. These different versions of
“one” system (with a single name) come to be separately
maintained, and marketing continue to sell “the system”
under a single name indicating that all features will
be uniﬁed in later releases. Eventually multiple, non-
uniﬁable versions exist, still bearing the same name.
There is a myth that philosophy (as a human activity)
is more relevant to day to day issues than to the deep
technicalities found in areas such as software design, where
simple procedures and laws will govern actions. Latour makes
the point that this is not the case: “Rhetoric is the name of
the discipline that has, for millennia, studied how people are
made to believe and behave and taught people how to persuade
others. Rhetoric is a fascinating albeit despised discipline, but
it becomes still more important when debates are so exacer-
bated that they become scientiﬁc and technical.” [8, p. 30].
In particular, those involved in rhetoric will enlist resources
to help them make their points, and the subtle use of naming
of artifacts is one of the tools deployed. Statements such as
“we will use Object Oriented Design to implement Blobbo on
a Windows platform” seek to persuade without opening the
black boxes denoted by the names “Object Oriented Design”,
“Blobbo” and “Windows”.
Naming and reference are unavoidable in software sys-
tems engineering and evolution. Names we use often remain
constant while entities, properties, context, requirements, and
understanding of different stakeholders are dynamic and inces-
santly changing. The application of naming and reference to
“a system” has many consequences for software evolvability,
some of which have been enumerated above, and merits further
detailed attention.
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